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Abstract
From 1975-1991, the Moroccan government engaged in an armed conflict in the Western
Sahara with the indigenous Sahrawi population, led by the Polisario Front (the independence
movement in the Western Sahara). The armed conflict began after the Moroccan occupation of
the territory was initiated by King Hasan II, immediately following Sahrawi independence from
Spain in 1975. Despite the existence of a ceasefire, organized by the United Nations in 1991,
there have been no further decisions made by the international community regarding the status of
the Western Sahara. In particular, there have been no developments in relation to a selfdetermination referendum, a decisive factor in whether or not the Sahrawi will be granted
sovereignty by the Moroccan government. Using a realist and liberal framework, this paper
analyzes the regional and international geopolitical and cultural conflicts preventing the
referendum from occurring and sovereignty being granted to the Sahrawi. Furthermore, this
research aims to develop a realist and liberalist analysis of indigenous autonomy underneath a
post-colonial critique and against a critical historical background.
Keywords: Western Sahara, Morocco, Algeria, Sahrawi, Polisario
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Introduction
The Western Sahara is located just south of Morocco, as shown in Figure 1, on the coast
of the Atlantic Ocean, in a territory deemed the Maghreb. The Maghreb encompasses the
countries of Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, Libya and the Western Sahara territory. The Western
Sahara spans 266,000 square kilometers of land, making it about the size of the state of Colorado
(World Factbook). The other neighboring countries are comprised of Mauritania and Algeria.
Although the territory is often blocked out in maps—without color, labeled as either the
“Spanish Sahara,” “Western Sahara,” or “Moroccan Sahara” and with no indication that people
live there—it is home to the Sahrawi people who are caught up in a political, economic, and
social conflict against Morocco. The indigenous Sahrawi population to the Western Sahara lived
under Spanish colonial rule until 1975 (Mundy, 2006). Following decolonization, Morocco
claimed the Western Sahara due to historical ethnic and cultural ties, citing the Alouaite dynasty.
Such claims contributed to the eventual occupation and led to an armed conflict between the
Moroccan government and the native Sahrawi.
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Figure 1: (Map of Western Sahara, 2012, retrieved from the United Nations)

European scientific research in the Western Sahara revealed the territory as a major
producer of phosphates, a necessary natural resource for the production of fertilizers. These
phosphate reserves are now responsible for over half of Morocco’s income, and are exported to
European countries and the United States (Morocco.com). In 1990, the United Nations (UN)
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intervened in the conflict between the Moroccan government and the Sahrawi, leading to a
ceasefire. The UN worked on a referendum agreement to give Western Sahara their
independence, which nearly passed, before it was dropped by the UN Security Council due to
French and American economic relationships with Morocco (Mundy, 2006). Since then, the
Sahrawi and Moroccan conflict has remained a ceasefire periodically discussed by the UN
Security Council. The lack of a referendum has been attributed to international trade agreements,
while Morocco presides over much of the territory.
The continuing stalemate at the UN is due in part to influence of Russia and the United
States. The history of competing ideologies (i.e. the Cold War) between these states, and the
region’s significant reliance on Russian and American trade partnerships with Algeria and
Morocco, directly impacts the fate of the Western Sahara and the Sahrawi population. The
distinct cultural identities, as well as political and economic tensions between Moroccans and the
people of the Western Sahara, perpetuates the marginalization of the Sahrawi people. The
interests of and tensions between the two superpowers, combined with regional tensions between
Morocco and Algeria, make it unlikely that the Sahrawi will obtain independence through
diplomatic means, which may lead to renewed armed conflict in the Maghreb.
This paper will employ a two-step research process. First, it will begin by introducing a
theoretical framework and historical information in order to answer the question, What is
stopping the United Nations from passing a referendum for independence in this disputed
territory? Second, it will undertake to estimate the implications of a possible referendum by way
of the additional research question, Do current deliberations signify a referendum passing, and if
so, to what extent will cultural tensions in the Maghreb impact the outcome of the referendum?
This research intends to elucidate the continuity of the conflict occurring in the Maghreb around
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Sahrawi independence, and the international implications further conflict may have. As this topic
is not well-known, this thesis attempts to illuminate the current and historical geopolitical
situation so that more readers may be informed on how the Sahrawi have been forgotten by the
international community.

Methodology
The application of a western gaze or epistemic framework often leads to methods that
reaffirm colonial interests (Brown, 2015, 59). For the purposes of this research, the thesis will
use the discourse of “self-determination” and “sovereignty” as they are used by the United
Nations, however, these terms are problematic because they provoke an array of feelings that,
“draw attention to the thousands of ways in which indigenous languages, knowledges and
cultures have been silenced or misrepresented, ridiculed or condemned in academic and popular
discourses,” (Tuhiwai Smith, 2012, 21). It is necessary to recognize the limitations of these terms
because of the exclusionary practices against those most affected by coloniality, and how this
also contributes to the othering of certain populations.
This thesis employs a case study approach in which Western Sahara geopolitics
demonstrates how independence movement can be stymied by a lack of international
recognition, therefore it is important to look at two prominent political theories of realism, or
power politics, and liberalism, or the foundation of democratic institutions. In order to apply
realism and liberalism, the research will use secondary sources to collect data, focusing largely
on qualitative data, and include aspects of both explanatory and exploratory research. The
explanatory aspect will focus and expand on the study of colonial legacy in regards to the realist
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and liberal theories that will be used to analyze the prevention of an independence referendum in
Western Sahara.
As the discipline, international studies, is continuously reconceptualizing its approach
towards global issues, this project will also incorporate aspects of exploratory research (DarianSmith, 2017). Exploratory research envelopes the development of “a set of working theories and
accounts of what may be going on,” (Darian-Smith, 2017, 96). This research approach is
necessary as the topic under discussion is currently unfolding, with particular regards towards
future outcomes. The complexities of these historical roots are being further uncovered as reports
on the topic are published, for example the United Nations Referendum between Morocco and
Polisario to resolve the conflict, that has been in discussion since 1991, was re-opened in
November 2018 and is currently still being deliberated as of May 2019.
Further, the secondary sources will originate from academic journals and books. These
journals and books will be in both English and French, to create a holistic approach to the topic.
Most of the journal articles and book chapters have been sourced from online databases (such as
JSTOR, ProQuest, EbscoHost, etc.). This article will also incorporate primary sources, such as
news articles from Le Monde, which will be used to expand on the current deliberations and
updates in the international community in regards to Sahrawi independence.

Theoretical Framework
While realism focuses on understanding power politics, or the balance of power,
liberalism focuses on the development of political institutions and processes (Morgenthau,
1958). When applied to the Western Saharan conflict, realism exhibits the historical and
contemporary tension between Algeria and Morocco, and the influence from Russia and the
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United States. In the same context, liberalism applies to the United Nations’ involvement in the
territory, despite the lack of a referendum for almost three decades. As a result, these two
theories need to be applied when discussing the topic of the Western Sahara, a territory that has
been characterized as the last existing colony in Africa under a non-European colonizer.
Political realism is useful when understanding the balance of power amongst countries on
the regional and international levels. There are three major sections of political realism: 1)
offensive realism, 2) defensive realism, and 3) structural realism (neorealism). Offensive realism
originates from the political scientist, John Mearsheimer, and focuses on the idea that states want
security and act aggressively as a result. This aggression may be a result of survival, but causes a
strife for power and the outbreak of conflict. Defensive realism indicates a “status quo bias” that
illustrates a state’s action out of regulation of the status quo (Wagner, 2010, 15). This category of
realism also disagrees with the assumption that states would act aggressively, indicating a respect
for the existing structure. Additionally, defensive realism asserts that, due to the nature of the
international structure, states are forced to expand in order to preserve their own independence.
Structural realism, or neorealism, claims that the international structure is anarchic, as there is no
world government, and describes the difference organization structures of global power. Kenneth
Waltz discusses that the United States and the Soviet Union gaining nuclear weapons during the
Cold War reduced the number of great world powers to two. (Wagner, 2010).
As briefly mentioned, liberalism encompasses different liberties, or freedoms, and was
developed as a way of combatting arbitrary forms of governance. Liberalism addresses freedoms
by means of developing a foundation for democratic systems. Liberal theory revolves around
government institutions and the arrangement of people in society. The theory describes a
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government as an organ of a free and functioning society, and the institution as a representative
body of the greater population. (Hobhouse, 1911).
Liberal theory also addresses free will, and freedom of mobility, emphasizing the
importance of individual choice (this is also seen through group selection). This liberal freedom
of mobility and choice has come to influence the creation of laissez-faire economic structure, or
the liberalization of trade. The liberal influence on trade is based on the affirmation of national
liberty, or freedom, and has a utilitarian effect, with the intent of creating the largest positive
impact on the greatest population. The creation of Free Trade was an attempt at creating peaceful
relationships between nations, establishing supply and demand flows between majority colonial
powers. In this way, colonial freedom, international freedom, and personal freedom, were
interconnected and dependent on one another, balancing governmental control and impact on
national freedom. (Hobhouse, 1911, 35). As a result, trade liberalization influenced the rapid
globalization of the international economic structure of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
To further develop this research, post-colonial theory will aid in the explanation of the
topic at hand. Jean-Marc Moura describes a distinction between “post-colonial” and
“postcolonial”. Post-colonial is the period of time after colonization, whereas postcolonial is
refers to the speeches, writings, and ways of analyzing the binary function of imperialists
(Moura, 2013). Specifically, Moura discusses postcolonialism in the context of globalization,
specifically stating that they are two different things. Postcolonial perspectives focus on the
representation of those previously excluded from the popular narrative, and then re-imagine
literary expression by shaping a new vision of the world (Moura, 2013).
Futhermore, Moura emphasizes a re-imagined and more complete perspective of the
world also has risks: the first being the possibility of allowing a generalized Eurocentric
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understanding of the world that could end up regulating or limiting the number of diverse
practices and cultures, or the other being the possibility of generating of so many different types
of literary approaches that colonialism would end up being the only constant throughout history
(Moura, 2013). The most relevant piece of Moura’s depiction of postcolonial theory is that there
are two different ways of study surrounding the relationship between globalization and
postcolonial studies; the first is an understanding that before the conquest, during, and postcolonial history can all be attributed as components of globalization; the second asserts
difference, labeling globalization as a threat to postcolonial projects focused on history and
politics (Moura, 2013).

The History of Western Sahara: A Literature Review
Colonialism (1884-1975)
The Spanish originally colonized the Western Sahara in 1884, and claimed it as the
Spanish Sahara, while the French colonized Morocco and Algeria, amongst other countries in
North and West Africa. In 1947, Spain launched the Empresa Nacional Minera del Sahara
(ENMINSA) research project into natural resource reserves in the territory, specifically oil and
phosphates, and later uranium. Initially, the research did not find any phosphates due to an
antiquated understanding of how to find and test phosphates, assuming they came from “marine
sediments left in land depressions during flood periods” (Camprubi, 2015). Morocco’s Office
Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP) and the French Comptoir de Phosphates de l’Afrique du Nord
were the two largest producers of phosphates in North Africa but in 1961, the French Comptoir
dissolved and the OCP became the main producer. After failing to find phosphates in the
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Western Sahara in 1947, ENMINSA focused on looking for uranium in the territory. This new
focus brought the Spanish to the Bu-Craa region in 1963. Bu-Craa is an area in the Western
Sahara, defined by one tree often used as reference point for indigenous populations. While
testing for uranium, Spain identified over 1.6 million tons of phosphates with “68 percent
average quality with veins of 80 percent purity,” making it the largest in the world (Camprubi,
2015).
The discovery of phosphates in the Western Sahara occurred during the height of the
Cold War, and Krushev’s Seven Year Plan, impacting agriculture on an international level.
ENMINSA, with their new mine at Bu-Craa, focused on building relationships with the United
States, rather than France, and their collaboration with the Compagnie Financière de l’Outre
Mer (Overseas Finance Company; COFIMER) ended in 1966. The United States focused on the
advantages of maintaining a global market and preventing regional monopolies. ENMINSA and
the Florida-based manufacturer International Mineral and Chemicals (IMC) negotiated a
business deal before Morocco interfered, sabotaging the agreement by influencing the stagnation
of phosphate prices in the global market. The World Phosphate Institute was founded in Paris,
France, where Morocco was granted power to veto possible members, such as Spain and Israel.
(Camprubi, 2015).
In 1973 the Popular Front for the liberation of Saguiat El-Hamra y Rio de Oro (Polisario
Front) was founded as the primary liberation movement against Spanish colonialism in the
Western Sahara. In response to the growing Polisario Front, Spain introduced a referendum that
allowed for the independence of the territory, which was vetoed by France and the United States,
both allies with Morocco. Morocco and Mauritania both indicated their historical claims on the
Western Sahara territory. This claim is in reference to the Alouaite dynasty, descendants of the
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prophet Muhammed, King Hassan II’s ancestors. However, the Sahrawi do not recognize
themselves as part of the Alouaite dynasty, citing the Almoravide state, or the unification of the
different indigenous tribes of the Maghreb and Northern Africa, including Amazigh and other
Berber tribes (Thomas, 2001). This claim resulted in the Moroccan and Mauritanian
governments joining forces to resist Spain’s attempt at passing a referendum for the Western
Sahara’s independence, which was rejected by the International Court of Justice in 1974
(Mundy, 2006). The International Court of Justice advised that it did not find any connection of
sovereignty over the Western Sahara for either Morocco or Mauritania (International Court of
Justice, 1975).
Despite the ruling by the International Court, King Hassan II of Morocco addressed
Moroccans on national television and radio in order to organize and launch the Green March on
October 16th, 1975, launching the Green March into motion. What was originally considered “the
king’s call” became “the Green March,” (Hafez, 2013). Over half a million Moroccans attempted
to register for the march, with only 350,000 chosen to participate (Hafez, 2013). As Spanish
forces were still in the North of the Western Sahara territory, supporting the Sahrawi
independence movement, King Hassan II organized in two blocs near the southern border. In
November, Hassan ordered one of the blocs to march south and over the border (Hafez, 2013).
This action constituted a positive response by Morocco, and stimulated its national identity.
As a response to the Green March, Spain chose to negotiate the future of the territory
with Morocco and Mauritania, rather than using military force (Dunbar, 2000). On February 26,
1976, the Spanish government declared they were no longer the ruling power over the territory
(Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013). As a way of also avoiding conflict with the Moroccan ally, the
United States, Spain gave their territory to Morocco and Mauritania (Mundy, 2006). The next
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day, February 27, the Polisario Front declared the creation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic
Republic (SADR) 1 (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013).
The Green March has since become a national holiday or moussem (“saint’s festival”)
celebrated as an act of mysticism, while re-enforcing the political authority of King Hassan II
(Hafez, 2013). The understanding of the Green March as a moussem indicates religious
influence, with the color green alluding to the Islamic faith, which is tied to the region of North
Africa through the Alouaite dynasty (Farah, 2010). Descendents of the Alouaite dynasty are who
currently rule the Kingdom of Morocco, as the bloodline of King Hassan II and his son
Mohammed VI are connected to the founder of the original dynasty (Stora, 1999). The Alouaites
are descendants of Fatima, the daughter of the prophet Mohammed of Islam (Stora, 1999).
Morocco insists that the Western Sahara was historically part of the Alouaite territorial rule.

War, Self-Determination, and Ceasefire (1975-2018)
From 1975-1991, the Polisario Front fought against the Moroccan government until the
United Nations negotiated a ceasefire between the two forces (Thomas, 2001). The United
Nations adopted three resolutions between 1977 and 1979 that gave the responsibility of
determining the status of the Western Sahara to the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
(Zunes, 2008). In 1979, the OAU created an agreement between Morocco and the Western
Sahara that would give the indigenous population the right to autonomy. The OAU officially
recognized the Polisaro-led Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) as a sovereign state in
1984 (Mundy, 2006). This led to Morocco suspending their membership in 1982 before formally

1

The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic is not the Polisario front, but rather the title of the nation living in exile and
being governed by the Polisario (Wilson, 2013).
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withdrawing in 1984 (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2013). Since then, over 90 countries in the Global
South have recognized the legitimacy of SADR and formed diplomatic ties (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh,
2013).
In 1988, the United Nations Security Council passed a resolution regarding the situation
in the Western Sahara to appoint a representative for the Western Sahara to the Security Council
(UNSCR, 1988). The resolution also called for a report “on the holding of a referendum for the
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara and on ways and means to ensure the
organization and supervision of such a referendum by the United Nations in co-operation with
the Organization of African Unity” (UNSCR, 1988, 18). However, the war between Morocco
and the SADR continued for another two years before the Security Council re-convened on the
topic. In 1990, the Security Council sent peacekeepers to the area, negotiating a ceasefire in the
territory (Zunes, 2008).
Throughout the course of the War, Morocco, backed by the United States, France, and
Saudi Arabia, was able to push back the Algerian-backed forces of the Polisario Front to occupy
half of the Western Sahara territory, which was now divided by a large border wall, while most
of the native population fled (Mundy, 2006). In 1991, the United Nations Mission for the
Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) committee was created in order to maintain peace
in the area and promote negotiations between the SADR and Morocco. The Security Council
began negotiating the requirements for the referendum, passing the Houston Accords in 1997,
which standardized the referendum process (Zunes, 2008). However, the United States and
France, both allies of Morocco, continued to threaten to veto the Security Council’s enforcement
of the accords (Zunes, 2008). The United Nations has passed seventy resolutions since 1975
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regarding the future of the Western Sahara, with the latest being passed in October 2018, without
passing a resolution to address the referendum (UNSCR, 1975-2018).

Morocco and Algeria
When the French government made Morocco a protectorate, the Varnier line was drawn
as a border between Morocco and Algeria (Heggoy, 1970). The border was originally supposed
to aid in the governance of trade within the territory, but later became an international border
(Heggoy, 1970). After the two Franco-Spanish treaties of 1904 and 1912, the Trinquet line was
formed in 1934 as a way of dividing Morocco and Algeria down the Draa Valley, without the
consent of the Moroccan government, giving the territory just south of the Draa Valley, the
Tindouf, to Morocco (Heggoy, 1970). However, the Franco-German Treaty of 1911 contradicted
the border when it stated that the Tindouf belonged to Algeria (Heggoy, 1970). In 1952, the
Tindouf region was officially declared part of French Algeria, after reviewing the past
administrative decisions (Farsoun, 1976). Later, during the Algerian struggle for independence
and after Moroccan independence was granted in 1956, the French attempted to negotiate by
giving the territory back to Morocco in exchange for aid in the conflict (Farsoun, 1976). Such
negotiations were nullified after protest from Moroccan citizens, prior to Algeria winning their
independence in 1962 (Farsoun, 1976).
The conflict between Morocco and Algeria over the territory of the Tindouf became a
military conflict in July 1963, when King Hassan II sent troops over the border into the middle of
the disputed territory. The epicenter of the conflict was located halfway between the towns of
Colomb-Bechar and Tindouf, both controlling the highway from Algeria, through Western
Sahara, and towards the coast (Farsoun, 1976). The militarized conflict, however, only lasted
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until January 1964, when diplomatic relations were re-instated to develop economic partnerships
in the territory (Farsoun, 1976). Despite the brevity of the war between Morocco and Algeria in
1963, the conflict resulted in the consolidation of the right-wing parties in both countries. King
Hassan II of Morocco moved to dissolve the left opposition. In turn, Moroccan conservativism
contributed to the further conservatizing of the Algerian regime (Farsoun, 1976). The augmented
right-wing influence in both countries contributed to tension, as their growing authoritarian
regimes sought economic and political power in territories like the Tindouf and the Western
Sahara, both rich in natural resources.

Russia, the United States, and the Maghreb
In Mohieddine Hadhri’s article, “U.S. Foreign Policy Toward North Africa During the
Cold War: From Eisenhower to Kennedy (1953-1963),” he discusses the relationship between
the United States and North African states during the height of the Cold War. Hadhri discusses
how the Truman Doctrine shaped American foreign policy by establishing basic principles and
commitments beginning in the 1940s and 1950s and lasting until the end of the Cold War period
(Hadhri, 2014). Hadhri continues, stating that American foreign policy was a key component of
the results of the de-colonization process in North Africa (Hadhri, 2014). Hadhri explains the
strategies of the North African countries consisted largely of exploiting Western antagonisms,
and this was used to manipulate power dynamics between France and the United States (Hadhri,
2014). Hadhri discusses how the United States’ National Security Council report on the Maghreb
emphasized the importance of preventing communist influence from infiltrating, describing this
as the “American objective in the Maghreb” (Hadhri, 2014, 103). Although the United States
was supportive of nationalistic movements in North Africa, the Eisenhower administration did
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not exclusively support the Algerian nationalist movement, the National Liberation Front (FLN)
because of American trade agreements, like the North Atlantic Trade Organization (NATO),
with France (Hadhri, 2014).
However, the Kennedy Administration quickly developed a reputation for being selfdetermination champions as President Kennedy gave a speech condemning the actions taken by
France in Algeria, as well as the Eisenhower decision to continue supplying the French with
arms through NATO (Hadhri, 2014). Hadhri explains that Kennedy’s speech provoked strong
reactions, with hope in North Africa and the Middle East and hostility in France. Hadhri also
discusses how Kennedy was considered a pragmatic idealist, as he believed the best way to
prevent communism from spreading would be for the United States to lead the developing social
revolutions (Hadhri, 2014). Hadhri goes on to explain that although the Kennedy administration
showed a considerable amount of interest in the Algerian revolution, the relationships that the
United States has with Morocco and Tunisia are the most important to U.S. interests (Hadhri,
2014). Similar to the Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy administration did not pursue a
closer relationship with Algeria because of NATO. The United States could not support the selfdetermination of the Algerians while also being allied with France (Hadhri, 2014).
Algerian relations with Russia (previously the Soviet Union) had developed since the
country won their independence from France. Algeria has been the third most important
consumer of weapons for Russia, after importing almost 80 percent of all their weaponry from
Russia between the 1960s and 1980s (Schumacher, 2015). However, in 1985, Algeria began
trading with the United States and importing American-made military aircrafts. At this time,
trade between Russia and Algeria came to a stand-still until 1999, when President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika was inaugurated in Algeria (Mokhefi, 2015). The Russo-Algerian relationship
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strengthened, and Russia became the top trade partner for arms and military equipment
(Mokhefi, 2015). In 2006, the relationship between Algeria and Russia transitioned to
incorporate energy development, specifically oil and natural gas. Russia is the number one
producer of natural gas in the world, and Algeria is the second largest producer of oil in Africa
(Mokhefi, 2015). Subsequently, both countries significantly influence the global economic
market, asserting their regional and international impact.

Sahrawi Resistance
As a result of the 1975 conflict between Morocco and the Polisario Front, nearly 200,000
Sahrawi refugees migrated to and now live in refugee camps in the Tindouf region of Algeria.
Much of the social and economic support received by these camps relies on humanitarian aid,
and the camps themselves were designed to be a temporary solution (Angeloni, 2018). At the
same time, conditions in the territory annexed by Morocco are also poor. There have been
reports of human rights abuses inflicted upon the Sahrawi by the Moroccan government, such as
unfair imprisonment and crowded prison conditions (News, 2014).
Further, since Morocco began occupying the Western Sahara in 1975, and continuing
through the stalemate in 1991, there has been an ongoing intifada, or uprising, in the Moroccanoccupied territory gaining significant momentum in recent years (Farah, 2010). These uprisings
have been a result of a recently developed organization in the Moroccan-occupied territory, the
Intifadah al-Istiqlal, or struggle of independence; the leaders are indigenous Sahrawi who grew
up under Moroccan rule, and classify themselves as first-generation nationalists (Mundy, 2006).
The Intifadah al-Istiqlal brought their movement to attention during protests in May 2006, and
were present for the funeral of a Sahrawi activist.

GEOPOLITICS OF WESTERN SAHARA

xxi

In October 2010, Gdiem Izik occurred in the Western Sahara, which began as a few tents and
later grew to over 25,000 protestors. The Gdiem Izik protests occurred prior to the larger Arab
Spring uprisings in North Africa, and were located outside of the capital of the annexed Western
Sahara, Laayoune (Wilson, 2013). Gdeim Izik protest focused on economic needs, but with
emphasis on the marginalization of the Sahrawi population. Wilson’s article also brings up the
difficulty of statistics when it comes to the Sahrawi population, because they are so dispersed
there are no exact population numbers attributed to either the Sahrawi’s who live within the
Moroccan-controlled borders or outside of them under the SADR. Wilson also discusses the
Sahrawi strategy of protesting the annexation through living as refugees, this is their way of
resisting Moroccan occupation (Wilson, 2013). A symbol of the Sahrawi resistance is the flag of
the SADR, symbolizing the sovereignty of the state (Farah, 2010).

Figure 2: (SADR Flag, 2016, retrieved from worldatlas.com)
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Analysis
In December 2018, the United Nations invited the Polisario Front, Morocco, Mauritania,
and Algeria, to negotiate and discuss the Western Sahara’s fate, opening discussions of
independence and self-determination for the area, two very different solutions (Le Monde AFP,
2019b). The last negotiations opened to the Polisario Front and Morocco occurred in 2007,
focusing on the specifics of a proposed referendum of self-determination, supported by the
United States, that did not end up happening because of Sahrawi insistence on sovereignty (Le
Monde AFP, 2018b).
The case for a referendum has been opened and closed at least 70 times since 1990, and
there has been no response from the United Nations. As a result of trade agreements, such as
free-trade agreements between the United States and Morocco and NATO, permanent members
of the Security Council have threatened the use of their veto power, and no referendum has been
passed. To understand the complexity of the situation, the analysis of this topic has been divided
into two main concepts: regional conflict and the monopolization of phosphates, and Russian and
American involvement.

Regional Conflict and the Monopolization of Phosphates
During the Cold War, the seven-year plan introduced by the Soviet Union’s Khrushchev
contributed to the augmentation of agriculture as a major component to the global economy,
which led to the world’s production of fertilizer doubling between 1954 and 1964, increasing the
demand for phosphates (Camprubi, 2015). The Spanish had discovered the phosphate reserves in
the Western Sahara but did not have the resources required to capitalize on their control over
these reserves. Instead they reached out to American companies to invest in the development of

GEOPOLITICS OF WESTERN SAHARA

xxiii

infrastructure to mine the reserves, but were subsequently prevented by Morocco, due to
competing trade relationships with the United States.
During their nineteen-year war with the Polisario Front, Morocco was able to obtain control
of over 80 percent of the Western Sahara territory, including the Bu-Craa region, with the
majority of the phosphate reserves. This action can be understood as offensive, given the context
of the global demand for phosphates. Particularly, after decades under French rule, the
annexation of the Western Sahara would set the Moroccan government up for economic
prosperity without the intervention of European powers.
Further, the war between the Moroccan government and the Polisario Front was significant
for the territory because Morocco was able to push the Polisario Front further into Algeria as
Morocco gained territory. As a result, Morocco was able to assert an increased regional
stronghold in North Africa. However, the territory that now houses the Polisario Front is in the
Tindouf region, a span of land that Morocco and Algeria have disputed since the end of French
colonization in the 1950s. Keeping the Sahrawi refugees housed in the Tindouf creates further
tension between Morocco and Algeria—the refugees do not recognize either Morocco or Algeria
as their government, but have chosen to continue living as refugees in a form of protest until a
decision is made on the referendum (News, 2014). The protests represent the Sahrawi refusal to
integrate into Moroccan society.
At the beginning of November 2018, the Moroccan government held a forum on the
affairs of Laayoune, the capital of the Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara, deciding to increase
funding towards the development of enterprise in the area (Le Monde AFP, 2018a). The
objective is to increase “l’attractivité” (the attractiveness) of the Atlantic Ports on the coast of
the Western Sahara and “les opportunités à saisir” (the opportunities to seize) production in
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different economic sectors including agriculture and construction (Le Monde AFP, 2018a).
Philippe-Edern Klein, the president of the Chambre française du commerce et d’industrie au
Maroc (the French Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Morocco; CFCIM), specifically said
that this forum was strictly for the development of the Western Sahara, and not politicallyinclined.
The development of infrastructure in Laayoune, as well as other parts of the Moroccanoccupied territory in the Western Sahara, indicates the intention of the Moroccan government to
continue controlling this territory. Moroccan development of infrastructure while maintaining
military control over the territory is consistent with liberal theory, indicating the acceleration of
democratic processes (e.g. infrastructure) with the presence of the military. The further
expansion and investment in development in the Western Sahara influences Moroccans to move
to the area, and as there are no exact population numbers attributed to either the Sahrawis who
live within the Moroccan-controlled borders, or outside of them under the SADR, the
international community can assume that Moroccans are the majority living in this area (Wilson,
2013).
In January 2019, the European Parliament extended Morocco’s trade agreement to
include the products exported from the Western Sahara territory. The combined trade of imports
and exports in the Moroccan economy is about 83.5 percent of the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) (Morocco, n.d.). Although the Polisario Front urged members of the European Union to
vote against such measures, indicating their fear of Morocco using this integration as a reason to
prevent the independence referendum in discussion from passing in the United Nations, the
extension passed with a large majority (444 votes for and 167 votes against) (Le Monde avec
AFP, 2019a). Although the extension passed, there is speculation that it goes against European
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and International Law because the European Union does not recognize Morocco’s sovereignty
over the territory, or the SADR as sovereign (Le Monde AFP, 2019a).
The expansion of trade with Morocco has significant consequences on the SADR, as the
European Union legitimizes Morocco’s claim over the territory. Phosphate contributes to nearly
half of the country’s economy while only employing 2 percent of the population (Morocco.com,
2019). However, these numbers illustrate the large dependence the Moroccan government has on
phosphate production. As shown in Figure 3, Morocco and the Western Sahara hold over 57
percent of the phosphates in the world.

Figure 3: (Global phosphate distribution, 2013, retrieved from BlueTech Research)

However, since the Western Sahara holds the largest amount of phosphates in the world,
it can be assumed that Moroccan occupation of the territory groups the two states together and
disregards the SADR. The legitimization of this categorization by the European Union validates
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Morocco’s claim over the territory, and therefore de-legitimizes the status of the SADR. This
also showcases an interdependent relationship between the European Union and Morocco,
emphasizing globalization. The legitimization of Morocco by the European Union influences the
power dynamics within North Africa, subsequently legitimizing the expansion of Moroccan
borders.

Russian and American Involvement
Since Vladimir Putin took office, the Russian strategy for foreign relations has
encompassed unpredictability, with the world taking notice as the war in Ukraine continues after
the annexation of Crimea, and the creation of the Eurasian Union (Schumacher, 2015). Arms
trade between Russia and Algeria increased by 10 percent between the years of 2003 and 2012,
indicating the improving economic relationships between the two countries (Schumacher, 2019).
Improved economic conditions indicate positive results from Russia’s growing involvement in
the Maghreb.
The relationship between Algeria and Russia transcends the supply of weapons, as the
support of Algerian military forces means the support of the Polisario Front, which is currently
housed within the borders of Algeria. In 2001, President Putin of Russia and President Bouteflika
of Algeria signed a strategic partnership agreement that aimed at the facilitation of Russian arms
deliveries and joint exploration of the hydrocarbon sector in Algeria’s countryside (Schumacher,
2015). With the establishment of this relationship, Russia is able to influence the production of
hydrocarbon energy within Algeria and moderate the establishment of power plants throughout
the country. In particular, Russia is able to take advantage of the Arab Spring uprisings in North
Africa in order to build a new sphere of influence. Expanding the Russian sphere of influence in
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North Africa threatens the current balance of power, encroaching on American economic
security (i.e. trade partnerships with Morocco), and thereby influencing Morocco’s hold on the
Western Sahara.
With the failure of democracy in Algeria, tension between Russia and Western powers
my increase due to a Russian security doctrine previously administered to high-ranking military
representatives from Algeria, and 40 other countries including Libya and Egypt. The doctrine
issued in May 2014, characterizes the United States as “a dangerous nation seeking to dismantle
Russian statehood and destabilize governments around the world,” which can be perceived as
Russia seeking influence in North Africa and the Middle East (Schumacher, 2015, 104). This
security doctrine indicates a continuation of tension between Russia and the United States, dating
back to the Cold War.
On February 22, 2019, students throughout Algeria began to protest the announced
candidacy of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika running for his fifth term (Kadiri, 2019). President
Bouteflika has been nicknamed “el Marokki” (the Moroccan) as he was born in Moroccan
territory prior to the annexation of specific borders between Algeria and Morocco. President
Bouteflika’s nickname signifies the tension between the two countries, and his unpopularity with
the majority of the country. The destabilization of Algeria, there was potential of these protests
to lead to a revolutionary movement, could negatively impact the upcoming negotiation talks on
the status of the Western Sahara (Kadiri, 2019). However, in the beginning of April 2019,
Abdelaziz agreed to resign from his presidency, backed by military leaders in the Algerian
government (Nossiter, 2019). This resignation still impacts on the stability of the Algerian
government, and gives potential to an increased military rule. As a consequence, the change in
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leadership will effect Algerian trade relationships, their tense relationship with Morocco, and
their relationship with the Sahrawi refugees.
As for Morocco’s relationship with Russia, the Kingdom is currently Russia’s most
important phosphate producer, upholding Moroccan position on Sahrawi self-determination, and
Russia has never formally recognized the SADR (Schumacher, 2015). Since the Russian
annexation of Ukraine, the sanctions on Russian trade relationships have led to greater economic
dependency on Morocco, which is also a major importer of Russian wheat. The relationship is
beneficial to both Russia and Morocco, as they are both able to export and import valuable
resources to support their economies. The prospect of this relationship extending into new oil
and gas agreements have the possibility of undermining or dismantling the relationships between
the American and French relationships with Morocco, who depend on these two powers for
economic and military support (Schumacher, 2015). The strengthening of Russo-Moroccan trade
relationships will complicate the ceasefire in Western Sahara, as Russia’s arms trade with
Algeria indirectly supports the Polisario Front. Russo-Moroccan relationships would also impact
American-Moroccan free trade agreements, again increasing tension between the United States
and Russia.
As Russia has increased interest in North African and Middle Eastern states, the United
States has not appointed an ambassador to Morocco since the new administration took office in
2017 (Laaroussi, 2019). Russia already has a strong relationship with Algeria, and the
strengthening of relations with Morocco could become a threat to the United States. Since 1945,
during the era of the Cold War, there has been consistent tension between the United States and
Russia. These two superpowers have a reputation of fighting over spheres of influence due to
ideological differences, upholding realist theory. This is exhibited through the foreign policy of
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Eisenhower and Kennedy, at the height of the Cold War. As the United States developed
relationships with countries in the Maghreb, keeping Russia out of the territory was a factor.
Additionally, the Algerian support of the development of the Polisario Front made the United
States fearful of the “sovietization” of the Western Sahara, increasing American support of the
Moroccan occupation (Camprubi, 2015, 694). The development of left-leaning governments in
the Maghreb would likely be threatening to the United States government, as it would decrease
the success of their influence in North Africa.
The impact of NATO is also prevalent in the current state of the Maghreb and the
Western Sahara. “[American] basic interests cannot be protected in North Africa without an
arrangement acceptable at once by France and the North-African countries” (Hadhri, 2014). The
United States was unable to support Algeria in their self-determination efforts because of their
close partnership with France. The United States and France are both close allies with Morocco,
two countries largely dependent on the import of phosphates in order to sustain their agricultural
markets. This dependency on trade with Morocco can be thought of as a dependency on the
Western Sahara, and therefore a dependency on the continued lack of recognition of sovereignty
of the SADR.
Russia and the United States both depend on Morocco and Algeria for agricultural and
energy production, indicating the abundance of resources in the Maghreb. Therefore, asserting
influence in the territory is important to the national interests of Russia and the United States,
aligning with realist theory. The national interests of these two global hegemons and the
European Union, paired with the regional tension between Morocco and Algeria, and, by
consequence, the forced indifference of the United Nations, leaves very little possibility for a
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referendum occurring. The prevention of a referendum, in correspondence with liberal theory,
signifies the engagement of Sahrawi populations as economic and political captives.

Implications and Recommendations
The United States and Russia’s involvement in the Maghreb will continue to influence
the status of the SADR because of the economic trade partnerships and interests in the area. The
United States, close allies with Morocco, influences the decision on the referendum that could
remove the Moroccan government from the Western Sahara. Meanwhile, the Russian
relationship with Algeria, who explicitly supports the Polisario Front, signifies a competition for
spheres of influence in the Maghreb. Morocco and Algeria are the two regional hegemons, with
pre-existing border disputes and disagreeing positions regarding the Western Sahara. Morocco
relies on the Western Sahara economically, exporting phosphates. Algeria relies on the Tindouf,
where the Polisario Front is based, for oil and the recent expansion of hydrocarbon energy, in
collaboration with Russia.
The tension in the Maghreb can be interpreted as a continuation of Cold War processes
because of the significant involvement from Russia and the United States, both countries
providing arms to Algeria and Morocco respectively. Their economic dependency on the
Western Sahara and the Tindouf regions set a precedent of continued involvement in the
Maghreb. As a result, with the lack of a referendum being passed to date, it is unclear whether
upcoming deliberations will ameliorate rising tension. The realist power dynamics in the
Maghreb are reinforced by liberal passivity, subsequently perpetuating a political standstill in
regards to SADR sovereignty. Such a political standstill benefits both Russian and American
economies.
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To further understand the complexities of this geographical area, future research will need to
examine the role of climate change on the global agricultural market, and how this will impact
on the demand for phosphates. It will be important to consider the role of the agricultural market
as Morocco’s control of phosphate production accounts for most of their economic prosperity.
With this, the development of alternative ingredients for fertilizer would decrease the demand for
phosphate production. However, the development of long-term sustainable aid to the refugee
camps in the Tindouf region may be more likely.

Conclusion
The future of the Sahrawi people will depend on emerging relationships among several
geopolitical actors, both within and beyond the territory of Western Sahara. Although there is a
resurgence of hope for independence, there is a long history of disappointment. The Sahrawi
population has been, quite blatantly, forgotten by the international community. This disregard
comes as a result of interests in both trade and influence in regions around the world, and
specifically in the Maghreb. The structure of the international economy has come to marginalize
the Sahrawi, with little to no potential for change.
This thesis has attempted to elucidate the geopolitical influences that have prevented
independence for the indigenous Sahrawi in the Western Sahara territory. Limitations to this
research reflect the ongoing nature of current efforts to renew discussion of the future of the
Western Sahara, as there was no explicit resolution from the discussions in Spring 2019, likely
attributed to the shift in power in Algeria. This lack of resolution combined with the recent
increase of Moroccan development in the Western Sahara and the European Union’s legitimizing
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of Moroccan occupation of the territory, is likely to increase tensions and may lead to the
resurgence of armed conflict in the Maghreb.
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